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PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE AND INDIGENOUS
RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM
Forthcoming, Windsor Review of Access to Justice (2005:2)
Dr. W. Wesley Pue∗
Peter Russell, widely known for his scholarship on constitutional matters, is one of Canada’s
pre-eminent political scientists. He has been an active participant in Canadian constitutional debates, a
pioneering “law and society” scholar, a founding figure and early President of the Canadian Law and
Society Association. His contributions to scholarly culture, to Canadian public discourse, and to
academic publishing are legion.1
His newest book takes us to another country on a distant continent and to a new series of issues.
Recognizing Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler
Colonialism2 is a remarkable work which canvasses the history of Aborigine-settler relations in
Australia from first European contact to the early twenty-first century. Its focal point is the surprising
High Court of Australia decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)3 in which an indigenous Australian
sought to establish his legal ownership of family lands in the face of seemingly unshakeable Australian
legal doctrine. The legal fiction by which the entire country was deemed to have been terra nullius at
the time of its discovery by Europeans made Mr. Mabo’s course challenging. Australian legal experts
had long assumed that Australia’s first peoples, unlike colonized indigenous peoples of Africa, Asia, or
North America, could hold no “traditional” title to lands. Overturning fiction long fossilized into legal
doctrine took some doing, and the book is dedicated “In memory of Eddie Koiki Maba, a shit disturber
par excellence”.
Russell’s explanation as to how he turned from scholarship on “high” constitutionalism to work
on the nitty-gritty of a particular British-based constitutional system is a salutary tale, part
methodological explanation, part theoretical insight and part mea culpa:
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As a decision on common law native title, the Mabo case did not, on its face, seem to be
of constitutional significance. If I did not include it among the Australian constitutional
developments I needed to examine, however, I would be perpetuating the narrow
understanding of constitutional politics that had characterized my earlier work.4
But for the guidance of Jillian Evans, who maintained a press-clippings room at the Australian National
University’s Research School of Social Sciences, he might have missed the significance of Mabo –
clearly the “big” story of Australian constitutionalism in these years – entirely. After more than three
decades of research on the failure of “grandiose projects of constitutional renewal”, Russell came to
perceive that
… the formal, written Constitution is only one of the components of a constitutional
system. The other components are political practices and conventions – organic statutes
that, even though they are not formally part of the “written” Constitution, define some
of a country’s governing institutions – and, finally but by no means least, judicial
decisions interpreting and developing the Constitution. I had come to appreciate that it
is through these various components of the constitutional system, including the
occasional amendment of the formal Constitution, that constitutional systems adapt and
evolve. Seen in this light, Mabo might well have constitutional significance.5
Indeed.
Mabo changed Australian constitutionalism, politics, and law profoundly. The interplay of law,
politics, constitutionalism, and history presented in Recognizing Aboriginal Title is subtle, nuanced and
thorough. Russell, in fact, presents five books in one. It includes an important historical interpretation
of European colonialism’s main streams of thought, apologetics and self-critiques, and also provides a
first class historical account of the workings-out of imperialist ideology through colonial law and
policy regulating relations with indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States, the four principle British settler-colonies. Third, the work provides an assessment of recent
developments in International Law relating to indigenous peoples, including their human rights and
sovereignty. Fourth, it offers an extended theoretical contribution through a critique of unreflective
legal positivism combined with a clear sighted realism as to the limited potential of litigation to effect
significant social change. This is, in part, a repudiation of the sort of popular “black letter”
constitutionalism that informs “One Nation” ideology in Australia, Reform Party understandings of
First Nations issues in Canada, and most mysteriously of all, Republican Party approaches to the U.S.
Constitution grounded in ‘original intent’. Finally, of course, the book provides an account of the
remarkable accomplishments of an individual who changed history: “Eddie Koiki Mabo, a Merian man
of the Pladarim clan, pearler, long-time exile, cane-cutter, dock-worker, loving husband, father and
grandfather, school founder, community activist, university groundsman, researcher and lecturer,
champion of Indigenous culture, and a courageous, indefatigable, but mortal litigator … an Australian
hero.”6
The book is exhaustively researched presenting a remarkable synthesis and interpretation of
diverse literatures. Its sweep makes it indispensable for those researching constitutionalism or
aboriginal issues in any of Canada, the United States, New Zealand or Australia, as well as for anyone
with historical interests in either British Imperial law or international law relating to colonialism. The
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five streams are woven into a tightly integrated, beautifully written, engaging, carefully conceived and
persuasive whole, making it a “must-read” well beyond narrow circles of subject-matter specialists.
These seemingly diverse spatial, political, and intellectual threads come together in the person
of Eddie Mabo and his struggle to prove title to land inherited under the laws of his peoples. Mabo was
raised in a traditional community on the Island of Mer (also known as Murray Island), one of the
Torres Strait Islands. The islands lie north of Australia, off Queensland’s Cape York, in waters
separating Papua New Guinea from mainland Australia.7 It was only as an adult who had already
established himself as an aboriginal activist that Mabo discovered the full extent of his dispossession
under Australian law. Russell describes a meeting at James Cook University “some time around 1974”
between historians Noel Loos and Henry Reynolds and Mabo, then a groundskeeper employed as a
research assistant:
Mabo talked about land that still belonged to him on Murray Island and his
determination to return to it. At this point, Loos and Reynolds exchanged glances and
tried to explain gently to Mabo that, because the land belonged to the Crown, he was
probably mistaken about his land ownership. To demonstrate the point, they took down
an old Queensland map and showed him that his island, like all the Torres Strait Islands,
was marked “Aboriginal Reserve”. Loos recalls that Mabo exploded at this explanation.
“I’d like to see someone take my land away from me,” he screamed at them.8
One might have thought that Mabo’s attempt to establish the legal entitlement of Meriam
people to ownership of their land unproblematic. Their mode of land use and ownership was easily
cognizable to European eyes. Under their own customary mechanisms of recognition and transmission
established under “Malo Law” property was divided into “garden plots and fish traps”.9 Even the forms
and processes of Malo Law were easily recognizable as such by Europeans, for they produced a sort of
“Oral Register of Title” not entirely unlike medieval customary landholdings in the United Kingdom.10
Moreover, Mabo’s claim was of a sort that had in fact been formally recognized during the history of
colonial governance in the region. The entire Malo system had been incorporated in Queensland law
through the work of the state’s “Murray Island Native Court”, which had produced a remarkable record
of dispute resolution seemingly confirming the existence of “native” title in the Islands. The Court
Book recorded “many cases over a period of eighty years in which the Island Court, authorized by
Queensland law, settled disputes according to the traditional system of land tenure”.11
Nonetheless, a peculiar Australian alchemy of colonial fantasy suffused legal doctrine to such
an extent that it was to take fully 10 years to establish the principle that there might be such a thing as
“native title” on the island. Australia’s founding ideology, grounded in a strong version of the terra
nullius mythology, gave way only reluctantly to observable fact, past state practice, and the internal
logic of British imperial law. Mabo’s stubborn insistence that Australian courts should look to lived
experience, history, and past state practices in order to correct an abstract, erroneous, but firmly
entrenched legal doctrine forms the heart of this book. Russell traces out the various legal and political
encounters along the way, as well as the follow-up to the High Court of Australia’s decision
(particularly in the Wik case12) and the political whirl-wind it brought forth.

7

Ibid. at 20-21 (Maps).
Ibid. at 28-29.
9
Ibid. at 204.
10
Mabo told a Townsville Conference in 1981 that Islander ownership of land was similar to that of the English, Welsh, and
Scots: ibid. at 194.
11
Ibid. at 204.
12
Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 187 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.A.).
8

The story is, in part, an edifying tale of heroic, individual, human agency. Eddie Mabo appears
as the principle hero, but there are others. Historian Henry Reynolds, surely the most important sociolegal scholar to emerge from Australia during the twentieth century, looms large, too. So do others. The
remarkable barrister, Barbara Hocking is credited as “the intellectual architect of the Mabo case”.13
“Much against the advice of her supervisor,” Hocking had completed a master’s thesis “on the
recognition of original native title by the colonial powers of Europe”.14 This work became central to the
legal arguments that eventually prevailed. The book is not just about heroic figures, however. It is also
a story about remarkable collective action by less celebrated Aboriginal peoples, of positive
developments in the courts and of developments in the international arena. Undoubtably, a form of
justice was worked in Mabo. Beneficial results flowed for Australia’s indigenous peoples. Legal action,
at least in the right “conjuncture”, worked for the good.
Peter Russell, however, does not naïvely leave things here. “Judges,” he points out, “have no
power to enforce their decisions. However revolutionary a judicial decision may be on paper, the
changes it effects in the real world depend on how the political system as a whole responds to it.”15 The
larger question of the practical outcomes of this heroic tale takes us into Australia’s collective psyche,
epitomized in the personality of the country’s tremendously popular Prime Minister, John Howard.
Howard, it turns out, announced his intentions early in a speech which “virtually amounted to a
declaration of war on Indigenous peoples’ rights.”16 Though remarkably similar to positions advanced
by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Cabinet Minister Jean Chretien in the 1960s, Prime
Minister Howard’s understandings find little contemporary resonance in international law,
historiography, or the common law of the former British Empire. The inappropriateness of gauging
aboriginal peoples’ entitlements only on the scales of “citizenship” or “minority rights” was
dramatically revealed to a mass Canadian readership over thirty-five years ago through the remarkable
work of the Cree leader and scholar Harold Cardinal. Whatever its problems, Canadian public policy
has never returned to those starting points.17 The possibility of starting from a position that recognizes
the “firstness” of First Peoples remains mysterious to many Australians, including their governing
party.
In other respects, however, the two countries apparently move in tandem. Russell’s assertion
that “Australian judges seem to be whittling native title down to ‘a bundle of rights’ – rights to carry on
specific traditional activities – rather than a controlling interest in their traditional country” applies
holus bolus in Canada, as demonstrated in R. v. Joshua Bernard,18 denying an aboriginal entitlement to
logging as an incident of Mi’kmaq treaty rights.
Aboriginal politics in Australia, like the kindred “history wars”19 are fought with a peculiar
intensity, ferocity, and at a pace seldom seen in Canada. Change can come at stunning speed, especially
if measured on the glacial scale of movement to which Canadian observers of aboriginal policy have
become accustomed. To take but one example, the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders Commission,
which Peter Russell describes in hopeful terms throughout the book,20 was abolished between the time
of writing and publication.21 It is impossible to be fully up to date.
13
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Where the future will lead remains unclear: as the book clearly illustrates, the interplay of law
and politics is complex, multi-leveled and unpredictable.

